Edited version of original here:
http://jwaversyria.blogspot.com/2018/01/turkish-invasion-into-kurdish-afrin.html
On the 21st of January this year, Turkey launched the long-anticipated operation into the northwestern Syrian province of Afrin, a small part of the large territory held by the Syrian Kurds. But this operation is just the beginning of larger scaled operations in northern Syria by the Turkish military.
The Syrian Kurds greatly threaten President Erdogan's hold over Turkey to such an extent that, with the entry of Russia into the Syrian war, President Erdogan has been forced into recalculating his regional policy. Though publicly denouncing Bashar Al-Assad and demanding his removal from office, privately, Turkish opposition to Assad has softened considerably.
https://sputniknews.com/politics/201701281050105764-turkey-syria-russia-iran/
It is US policy, not Russian policy, that threatens Turkish interest in the region, and that because the US is funding the Syrian Kurds after the destruction of ISIS in Syria. Though Bashar Al-Assad is secular and not Islamist, he leads the Syrian Arab Republic, which favours the Arabs over the Kurds. But the US-supported Syrian Democratic Forces are largely Kurdish, and many of these fighters are allied to the YPG, which has been waging war against the Turkish government for decades.
Sentiment in Turkey is perhaps best expressed by MP Metin Kulunk: "Syria will become a second Vietnam for the US." This sentiment will likely embolden President Erdogan into not stopping the Turkish invasion into Afrin, but additionally fighting for control of Manbij to force the Kurds to the eastern side of the Euphrates River.
https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/201711161059157430-syria-second-vietnam-for-us/
Turkish ambition may not be limited to west of the Euphrates, either. Russia, Syria and Iran are not interested in seeing a long-term US presence in northeastern Syria. They see that this undermines the territorial sovereignty of Syria, but any attacks on the northeastern enclave by Russia, Syria or Iran would ignite serious hostility from the US.
Turkey, on the other hand, is a NATO ally. Turkish war on the US-backed Kurds in Syria would have more serious consequences for the US than anyone else. In such a scenario, the US would be forced to use Iraq for transit or withdraw entirely from Syria. Turkey would become a more permanent member of the Russian axis in the Middle-East, would purchase the Russia-designed S-300 missile defense system and result in Turkey's expulsion from the NATO alliance.
Either the US would abandon the Syrian Kurds and make an exit strategy from Syria, which is a shared goal of Russia, Syria, Iran and Turkey - or the United States would be forced into a conflict deeply unpopular at home.
As the Turks seek to remove the US-Kurdish presence from Syria, this might give Russia, Syria and Iran the green light they need from Turkey to cede the rebel-held province of Idlib to the Syrian government. Idlib is largely under the control of Al-Qaeda, but has also served as a dumping ground for rebels from other regions in Syria.
War between Turkey and the United States for northern Syria would humiliate the US and cede the region to Turkish influence - in exchange, Bashar Al-Assad would regain control of Idlib province. Such an arrangement would mean no further roadblocks would exist for Turkey, Russia, Syria and Iran to seriously negotiate a political settlement for ending the Syrian civil war.
Saturday, October 13, 2018
Wednesday, September 12, 2018
Iran: Israel's 'Baptism of Fire'
First published 20/5/18:
http://jwaverfpolicy.blogspot.com/2018/05/iran-israels-baptism-of-fire-into-full.html
Pundits often said that the options with Iran were a nuclear deal or war. They may be right - but if so, it is unlikely to be US troops on the ground fighting it.
The American public are exhausted of war. President Donald Trump won his historic presidential campaign on an anti-war platform, including lambasting the "big, fat mistake" of the Iraq War. If the Iraq War was a big fat mistake for the US, an Iran war would be one of the biggest, fattest US conflicts since the Second World War.
In 2013, when Congress voted whether or not to strike the Syrian government, the American public were overwhelmingly against it. Since then, anti-war sentiment in the United States has not grown weaker but stronger.
So with a war-weary America, why has President Trump pulled out of the Iran Deal and made war with Iran more likely? Because though he cannot fight this war with current public support, he also knows he is not expected to by his closest ally Israel - except as a last resort.
Israel, on the other hand, is ready for war. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been granted overwhelming war powers, giving him the ability to wage war without a cabinet vote. Israel is also being welcomed into the Arab fold by countries Saudi Arabia, Egypt and UAE in particular, with an Israeli-Palestinian deal pending before full relations begin.
Prime Minister Netanyahu's rhetoric against Iran and its nuclear deal has culminated in Israel and Iran engaging in a series of military strikes in Syria. Yet with the risk of nuclear proliferation from Iran looming, Premier Netanyahu is unlikely to focus Israel's efforts on striking Iran's proxies. The Prime Minister has been known for having a "go at it alone" approach in Middle-East affairs, such as when he went to the House of Representatives in Washington to condemn the Iran nuclear deal in 2015, against President Obama's wishes.
In a conflict with Iran, Israel would not only have the political support of the United States (which Israel did not have under President Obama) but Israel would also be supported by many of its Arab neighbours. In fact, an Israeli war with Iran may just be the "baptism of fire" required by the Arab states to prove that Israel can vouch for their security. With the rise of Turkey as another adversary to Arab determinism in the Middle-East and beyond, Israel is more likely to garner Arab support should it prove itself by militarily intervening against the enemies of the Arabs, such as Iran.
In such a context, perhaps it is understood by both President Trump and Premier Netanyahu that, in the advent of an Iran War, an Iran-Israeli conflict is the best case scenario for the US, Israel and the wider Middle-East: President Trump would not embroil the US in another costly Middle-East conflict, Israel would prove itself capable of protecting its Arab neighbours, and Israeli-Arab relations would soar.
Since its initial fight for survival, the nation of Israel has come a long way with its Arab neighbours. Because of this, the fury of the Israeli military may soon, with Arab support, be directed against Iran, a stark and historic contrast to previous conflicts.
http://jwaverfpolicy.blogspot.com/2018/05/iran-israels-baptism-of-fire-into-full.html
Pundits often said that the options with Iran were a nuclear deal or war. They may be right - but if so, it is unlikely to be US troops on the ground fighting it.
The American public are exhausted of war. President Donald Trump won his historic presidential campaign on an anti-war platform, including lambasting the "big, fat mistake" of the Iraq War. If the Iraq War was a big fat mistake for the US, an Iran war would be one of the biggest, fattest US conflicts since the Second World War.
In 2013, when Congress voted whether or not to strike the Syrian government, the American public were overwhelmingly against it. Since then, anti-war sentiment in the United States has not grown weaker but stronger.
So with a war-weary America, why has President Trump pulled out of the Iran Deal and made war with Iran more likely? Because though he cannot fight this war with current public support, he also knows he is not expected to by his closest ally Israel - except as a last resort.
Israel, on the other hand, is ready for war. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been granted overwhelming war powers, giving him the ability to wage war without a cabinet vote. Israel is also being welcomed into the Arab fold by countries Saudi Arabia, Egypt and UAE in particular, with an Israeli-Palestinian deal pending before full relations begin.
Prime Minister Netanyahu's rhetoric against Iran and its nuclear deal has culminated in Israel and Iran engaging in a series of military strikes in Syria. Yet with the risk of nuclear proliferation from Iran looming, Premier Netanyahu is unlikely to focus Israel's efforts on striking Iran's proxies. The Prime Minister has been known for having a "go at it alone" approach in Middle-East affairs, such as when he went to the House of Representatives in Washington to condemn the Iran nuclear deal in 2015, against President Obama's wishes.
In a conflict with Iran, Israel would not only have the political support of the United States (which Israel did not have under President Obama) but Israel would also be supported by many of its Arab neighbours. In fact, an Israeli war with Iran may just be the "baptism of fire" required by the Arab states to prove that Israel can vouch for their security. With the rise of Turkey as another adversary to Arab determinism in the Middle-East and beyond, Israel is more likely to garner Arab support should it prove itself by militarily intervening against the enemies of the Arabs, such as Iran.
In such a context, perhaps it is understood by both President Trump and Premier Netanyahu that, in the advent of an Iran War, an Iran-Israeli conflict is the best case scenario for the US, Israel and the wider Middle-East: President Trump would not embroil the US in another costly Middle-East conflict, Israel would prove itself capable of protecting its Arab neighbours, and Israeli-Arab relations would soar.
Since its initial fight for survival, the nation of Israel has come a long way with its Arab neighbours. Because of this, the fury of the Israeli military may soon, with Arab support, be directed against Iran, a stark and historic contrast to previous conflicts.
Monday, September 10, 2018
The impending Russia-US deal on Afghanistan
First published 24/8/18:
http://jwaverterror.blogspot.com/2018/08/why-us-must-withdraw-from-pakistan-to.html
To win more speedily in Afghanistan, the United States must repair relations with Russia, withdraw from Pakistan and take the northern route into the country.
If there was ever a chance for President Trump to restore relations with Russia, weaken China and defeat radical Islamism, Afghanistan is that opportunity.
It has been a year since the Trump Administration unveiled its South Asia strategy, which was aimed at ending the Afghan war by having a conditions-based approach rather than a time-based approach, applying more international pressure on Pakistan, increasing trilateral ties between the US, India and Afghanistan and, most importantly for the US, achieving an outcome worthy of the sacrifices of the US military in South and Central Asia.
Unlike Iraq, Syria or Libya, the involvement of the United States in Afghanistan has been with support from the majority of the Afghan people and has been against a regime linked to the terrorists who perpetrated 9-11 - the Taliban. As former President Obama rightly said, if the Iraq war was the "bad war," Afghanistan was the "good war."
For the Trump Administration to pull out of Afghanistan at this critical moment would send a message to America's adversities that it has no interest in prolonged and expensive conflicts, leading America's adversities to make calculated risks against it, like the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. In short, US withdrawal from Afghanistan would make war with Iran or North Korea more likely rather than less likely.
The current South Asia strategy has shown positive results in 12 months. For the first time since 2001, two cease-fires were announced during Eid Al-Fitr between the Taliban and the Ghani government, an unprecedented moment in the last 40 years of conflict. This can be directly related to US pressure on Pakistan and increased ties with India, perhaps the most successful changes in the US' strategy.
While maintaining pressure on Paksitan is achieving positive results in the short-term, in the long-term Pakistan is not a strategic partner that shares the same interests as those of the United States. Pakistan has no geopolitical interest in seeing a pro-US democracy in Afghanistan, nor in dismantling the Haqqani network or the Taliban.
Pakistan also has covert support from China in continuing its destabilizing policy. This is particularly relevant as Pakistan funds terrorism in India-related spheres of influence, which includes Afghanistan. With the US increasingly looking to China as their greatest adversity, Pakistan should be seen as an Islamist-Chinese vessel that shares little strategic interest with the United States - and that in spite of the election of new Prime Minister Imran Khan.
Conversely, Russia has a geo-strategic interest in Afghanistan as paramount to that of the United States. Unlike China, Russia sees Afghanistan as a springboard from which terrorism could reach its southern border. For this reason the Kremlin is deepening relations with Pakistan and the Taliban, not out of interest but out of necessity, as few in Russia really believe the United States will remain in Afghanistan much longer.
Yet for all the Media talk of withdrawal, under President Trump the United States is more invested in Afghanistan than ever. Just recently in a Military Times article titled "US rejects invitation to join Russia talks on Afghanistan," the journalist notes that Afghanistan will be integrated by the US into its Indo-Pacific strategy. This can only mean one thing: further deterioration of relations between Pakistan and the United States in exchange for closer cooperation with India in Afghanistan and the wider region.
However, should relations deteriorate further, the Pakistanis will block the US from entering Afghanistan via their sea-land routes, as Afghanistan remains land-locked. This will put the Trump Administration in a very difficult position: to withdraw from Afghanistan would cede the region to China; to wage war with Pakistan or Iran for a land route would be deeply unpopular with the American public.
But a deal with Russia could provide the solution to this conundrum.
Many of President Trump's supporters see that a deal with Russia is not only preferable but essential for curbing Chinese influence worldwide. Right now Russian-Chinese ties are exceptionally strong, comparable to ties between the United States and Britain at the conclusion of the Second World War. To make inroads on this tight alliance must begin with converging interests.
This has played out to a certain extent in Syria, but the US' unwillingness to engage in any peace process except Geneva has had a counter-productive impact on US-Russian relations. But shared goals of eliminating terrorism, restoring stability to Syria and securing Israel's interests are proof that, indeed, Russia and the United States agree on enough that a future deal regarding Afghanistan is possible.
Components of such a deal would likely include ceding Pakistan to Russia, the relaxing of certain US sanctions and promising Russia and the nations on Afghanistan's northern border a more significant portion of Afghan economic projects - and that over Pakistan, China and Iran. In exchange, Russia would provide the US a land route into Afghanistan, more support for the Afghan government and more assistance in America's counter-terrorism strategy.
Such a deal may even be in the works right now, but through India rather than direct contacts. India has strong ties to both Russia and the United States and has a vested interest in weaning the US off Pakistan in exchange for more friendly ties with the Kremlin.
For Afghanistan's sake, a US-Russian-Indian deal is best case scenario. Worst case scenario is a repeat of the debacle of the 1980's, with another superpower defeated by Pakistan and terrorism ready to strike the world again.
http://jwaverterror.blogspot.com/2018/08/why-us-must-withdraw-from-pakistan-to.html
To win more speedily in Afghanistan, the United States must repair relations with Russia, withdraw from Pakistan and take the northern route into the country.
If there was ever a chance for President Trump to restore relations with Russia, weaken China and defeat radical Islamism, Afghanistan is that opportunity.
It has been a year since the Trump Administration unveiled its South Asia strategy, which was aimed at ending the Afghan war by having a conditions-based approach rather than a time-based approach, applying more international pressure on Pakistan, increasing trilateral ties between the US, India and Afghanistan and, most importantly for the US, achieving an outcome worthy of the sacrifices of the US military in South and Central Asia.
Unlike Iraq, Syria or Libya, the involvement of the United States in Afghanistan has been with support from the majority of the Afghan people and has been against a regime linked to the terrorists who perpetrated 9-11 - the Taliban. As former President Obama rightly said, if the Iraq war was the "bad war," Afghanistan was the "good war."
For the Trump Administration to pull out of Afghanistan at this critical moment would send a message to America's adversities that it has no interest in prolonged and expensive conflicts, leading America's adversities to make calculated risks against it, like the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. In short, US withdrawal from Afghanistan would make war with Iran or North Korea more likely rather than less likely.
The current South Asia strategy has shown positive results in 12 months. For the first time since 2001, two cease-fires were announced during Eid Al-Fitr between the Taliban and the Ghani government, an unprecedented moment in the last 40 years of conflict. This can be directly related to US pressure on Pakistan and increased ties with India, perhaps the most successful changes in the US' strategy.
While maintaining pressure on Paksitan is achieving positive results in the short-term, in the long-term Pakistan is not a strategic partner that shares the same interests as those of the United States. Pakistan has no geopolitical interest in seeing a pro-US democracy in Afghanistan, nor in dismantling the Haqqani network or the Taliban.
Pakistan also has covert support from China in continuing its destabilizing policy. This is particularly relevant as Pakistan funds terrorism in India-related spheres of influence, which includes Afghanistan. With the US increasingly looking to China as their greatest adversity, Pakistan should be seen as an Islamist-Chinese vessel that shares little strategic interest with the United States - and that in spite of the election of new Prime Minister Imran Khan.
Conversely, Russia has a geo-strategic interest in Afghanistan as paramount to that of the United States. Unlike China, Russia sees Afghanistan as a springboard from which terrorism could reach its southern border. For this reason the Kremlin is deepening relations with Pakistan and the Taliban, not out of interest but out of necessity, as few in Russia really believe the United States will remain in Afghanistan much longer.
Yet for all the Media talk of withdrawal, under President Trump the United States is more invested in Afghanistan than ever. Just recently in a Military Times article titled "US rejects invitation to join Russia talks on Afghanistan," the journalist notes that Afghanistan will be integrated by the US into its Indo-Pacific strategy. This can only mean one thing: further deterioration of relations between Pakistan and the United States in exchange for closer cooperation with India in Afghanistan and the wider region.
However, should relations deteriorate further, the Pakistanis will block the US from entering Afghanistan via their sea-land routes, as Afghanistan remains land-locked. This will put the Trump Administration in a very difficult position: to withdraw from Afghanistan would cede the region to China; to wage war with Pakistan or Iran for a land route would be deeply unpopular with the American public.
But a deal with Russia could provide the solution to this conundrum.
Many of President Trump's supporters see that a deal with Russia is not only preferable but essential for curbing Chinese influence worldwide. Right now Russian-Chinese ties are exceptionally strong, comparable to ties between the United States and Britain at the conclusion of the Second World War. To make inroads on this tight alliance must begin with converging interests.
This has played out to a certain extent in Syria, but the US' unwillingness to engage in any peace process except Geneva has had a counter-productive impact on US-Russian relations. But shared goals of eliminating terrorism, restoring stability to Syria and securing Israel's interests are proof that, indeed, Russia and the United States agree on enough that a future deal regarding Afghanistan is possible.
Components of such a deal would likely include ceding Pakistan to Russia, the relaxing of certain US sanctions and promising Russia and the nations on Afghanistan's northern border a more significant portion of Afghan economic projects - and that over Pakistan, China and Iran. In exchange, Russia would provide the US a land route into Afghanistan, more support for the Afghan government and more assistance in America's counter-terrorism strategy.
Such a deal may even be in the works right now, but through India rather than direct contacts. India has strong ties to both Russia and the United States and has a vested interest in weaning the US off Pakistan in exchange for more friendly ties with the Kremlin.
For Afghanistan's sake, a US-Russian-Indian deal is best case scenario. Worst case scenario is a repeat of the debacle of the 1980's, with another superpower defeated by Pakistan and terrorism ready to strike the world again.
Yemen: the next Islamic State
Published previously on 23/12/17:
http://jwaverforgotten.blogspot.com/2017/12/yemen-next-islamic-state-update-2018.html
Since the 21st of April 2015, Saudi Arabia has been leading a coalition against Zaidi rebels in Yemen, the Houthis, in an attempt to restore the recognized President of Yemen, Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, to power. In the subsequent chaos of the Yemen war, there has been one group gaining momentum at the expense of both President Hadi and the Zaidi Houthi rebels.
And it is not ISIS.
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is gaining the most out of the chaos of Saudi Arabia's Yemen war. Like ISIS, which was born out of the Iraq War and built up during the Syrian civil war, AQAP is building up its momentum as a direct result of foreign intervention. And like ISIS, AQAP is underestimated by the group utilizing them.
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, though dangerous, is perceived by Saudi Arabia as the 'lesser of two evils' against the Houthis and thus receives aid to fight the Zaidi rebels. AQAP has since emerged as a legitimate player for control of Yemen.
It is unlikely that AQAP would attempt to establish a Caliphate as ISIS has done. The reason for this is that the tribes working with AQAP have a different political agenda. ISIS was born out of an alliance with Iraqi Ba'ath Party militants disenfranchised with America's vision for a democratic Iraq. The Iraqi Ba'ath Party has sought to create unity across different countries, which coincides with ISIS' aim in establishing a caliphate.
The tribes which back AQAP are largely tribes from Southern Yemen, a previously independent state known as the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. These tribes seek independence from (and the crippling of) the government based in Sana'a in the north.
The UAE is already anticipating that such independence will be achieved. With Yemen President Hadi showing few signs of popularity on the ground, UAE is shifting its support to Aidarous Az-Zubaidi, a figurehead of the Southern Movement, drawing harsh criticisms from the Hadi government.
As with Sisi in Egypt and Haftar Al-Khalifa in Libya, strengthening the Southern Movement in Yemen would mean that the tribes in the south would become anti-Islamist, autocratic, and would force AQAP into the north exclusively.
In Northern Yemen, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has been the most effective fighting force against the Houthis. No matter who controls Southern Yemen, AQAP will continue gaining strongholds in Northern Yemen at the expense of the Houthis. This would likely weaken Northern Yemen sufficiently enough for the south to achieve autonomy.
However, the threat posed by an AQAP-dominated Northern Yemen is not to be underestimated. It threatens not only Southern Yemen and Saudi Arabia, but the United States as well.
Unfortunately for Yemen, the options are few. There are few forces in the region capable of defeating the Houthis. Like in Iraq and Syria, moderate forces are highly unlikely to win this war: Al-Qaeda and the Houthis are far stronger contenders.
http://jwaverforgotten.blogspot.com/2017/12/yemen-next-islamic-state-update-2018.html
Since the 21st of April 2015, Saudi Arabia has been leading a coalition against Zaidi rebels in Yemen, the Houthis, in an attempt to restore the recognized President of Yemen, Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, to power. In the subsequent chaos of the Yemen war, there has been one group gaining momentum at the expense of both President Hadi and the Zaidi Houthi rebels.
And it is not ISIS.
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is gaining the most out of the chaos of Saudi Arabia's Yemen war. Like ISIS, which was born out of the Iraq War and built up during the Syrian civil war, AQAP is building up its momentum as a direct result of foreign intervention. And like ISIS, AQAP is underestimated by the group utilizing them.
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, though dangerous, is perceived by Saudi Arabia as the 'lesser of two evils' against the Houthis and thus receives aid to fight the Zaidi rebels. AQAP has since emerged as a legitimate player for control of Yemen.
It is unlikely that AQAP would attempt to establish a Caliphate as ISIS has done. The reason for this is that the tribes working with AQAP have a different political agenda. ISIS was born out of an alliance with Iraqi Ba'ath Party militants disenfranchised with America's vision for a democratic Iraq. The Iraqi Ba'ath Party has sought to create unity across different countries, which coincides with ISIS' aim in establishing a caliphate.
The tribes which back AQAP are largely tribes from Southern Yemen, a previously independent state known as the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. These tribes seek independence from (and the crippling of) the government based in Sana'a in the north.
The UAE is already anticipating that such independence will be achieved. With Yemen President Hadi showing few signs of popularity on the ground, UAE is shifting its support to Aidarous Az-Zubaidi, a figurehead of the Southern Movement, drawing harsh criticisms from the Hadi government.
As with Sisi in Egypt and Haftar Al-Khalifa in Libya, strengthening the Southern Movement in Yemen would mean that the tribes in the south would become anti-Islamist, autocratic, and would force AQAP into the north exclusively.
In Northern Yemen, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has been the most effective fighting force against the Houthis. No matter who controls Southern Yemen, AQAP will continue gaining strongholds in Northern Yemen at the expense of the Houthis. This would likely weaken Northern Yemen sufficiently enough for the south to achieve autonomy.
However, the threat posed by an AQAP-dominated Northern Yemen is not to be underestimated. It threatens not only Southern Yemen and Saudi Arabia, but the United States as well.
Unfortunately for Yemen, the options are few. There are few forces in the region capable of defeating the Houthis. Like in Iraq and Syria, moderate forces are highly unlikely to win this war: Al-Qaeda and the Houthis are far stronger contenders.
As Iraq, Syria defeat ISIS, Al-Qaeda looms large
Mosul has been recaptured by the Iraqi Army from ISIS. ISIS-held Raqqa is currently besieged from all sides by the Syrian Kurds. And the Syrian Arab Army, bolstered by de-escalation zones in the west of the country, has massed its troops in the east, scoring victory after victory against ISIS in Syria.
While things are currently looking up for Syria and Iraq, Al-Qaeda still maintains its presence in Afghanistan. A resurgent Taliban is winning the war against the government led by Ashraf Ghani and, contrary to popular belief, the Taliban maintains its close relationship with Al-Qaeda, as the leader of Al-Qaeda still pledges allegiance to the leader of the Taliban.
This exposes fatal flaws in the previous President Obama’s strategy: killing Bin Laden did not stop Al-Qaeda from growing. Announcing troop surges and troop withdrawals in Afghanistan did not work. Negotiating with the Taliban was as impractical as negotiating with Al-Qaeda. And, finally, focusing on degrading, defeating and destroying ISIS has not stopped a resurgent Al-Qaeda from taking the limelight back.
Though ISIS is a long-term threat which is highly likely to return, Al-Qaeda is the more immediate threat, and the threat has grown. Not only has the Taliban filled the vacuum left by Obama in Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has become a potent threat taking advantage of the Saudi war on Yemen. Al-Qaeda also has a strong presence in Libya and, finally, those “moderate rebels” in Syria are all allied with Al-Qaeda.
While President Trump can be blamed for Al-Qaeda’s presence in Yemen, President Obama is to blame for the Al-Qaeda presence in Afghanistan, Syria and Libya. Libyan President Moammar Al-Qaddafi was overthrown in 2011, creating a vacuum in Libya, and Syrian rebels were supported by the US government from 2013 until this year. Ironically, it has been Russia who has been moving to quell the Al-Qaeda threat in Syria and Libya and, unlike President Obama, has had more success in rooting them out.
Afghanistan however becomes the responsibility of US President Donald Trump. Over the past 8 months there has been much debating in the White House about the way forward in Afghanistan, and President Trump has grown increasingly frustrated with US generals suggesting the way forward is to continue the same as before. President Trump has been exploring a wide range of options, including withdrawal and handing Afghanistan to private contractors, but the most enticing idea yet has been giving the US and Afghan troops a new goal: minerals.
Afghanistan’s minerals make up a large revenue for the Taliban, and depriving the Taliban of this revenue would weaken their influence in the country considerably. Minerals in the government’s hands would help Afghanistan stand on its own two feet and help win rogue Afghan tribes back to the government. It would also win Trump support back home for continuing the war.
But Afghanistan is not the only country from which Trump will face his counter-terrorism test: Yemen is the other. Trump has strengthened US support in the Saudi war against Yemen and this has resulted in an increase in Al-Qaeda’s presence there. The rise of Al-Qaeda in Yemen (commonly known as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) is not dependent on territory controlled, as ISIS is;
rather it is dependent on tribes which are loyal to and grateful for Al-Qaeda's presence in the region. And there are many such tribes in Yemen.
Even should Trump create a cohesive strategy to root out the Taliban from Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda will become even more powerful and resurgent in Yemen. This will likely strain US-Saudi relations and allow Russia a hand in solving yet another US-created quagmire.
The Al-Qaeda threat looms large, and calls for dedicated attention and skilful strategy.
Iran and Kurds greatest threat to Iraqi peace
Unlike Syria, Iraq's path to stability is not so straightforward.
Though ISIS has been driven out of its urban centres in Iraq, they still hold onto areas in Tel Afar, Hawija and western Anbar Province. Even should the Iraqi Army and affiliates crush ISIS from the region, there is every potential that ISIS may return. The trigger for an ISIS return is further conflict fueled by Iran and the Kurdish question.
September this year will see the Kurds vote for independence in a referendum. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi, though pro-American, is anti-referendum and as such Kurdish independence would weaken his hand considerably. This could lead to a civil war between the Iraqi Kurds and the rest of Iraq, putting America in a difficult position, as both Iraq and the Kurds are US allies.
Unlike in Syria, Iran is a destabilizing factor in Iraq. With the Iraqi provincial and federal elections to take place in 2018, a new divide is emerging: on one side of the divide is the likes of Nouri Al-Maliki and Iranian-backed political parties and militias. On the other is Muqtada As-Sadr, Iyad Allawi and Haider Al-Abadi, who espouse Iraqi Nationalism and are more critical of Iran's role in the region. Yet both sides of this divide are Shi'ite.
With the establishment of Hash'd Ash-Sha'abi, or the Popular Mobilization forces, an intra Shi'ite war in Iraq is all the more likely, as many of the groups are fierce rivals and differ in how loyal they are to Iran or the Iraqi government. To strengthen his own hand, Abadi might unleash the Iranian-backed elements of Hashd Ash-Sha'abi on the Kurds, so that if the Kurds were victorious, Iran could be blamed and Abadi would remain Prime Minister.
In any case, Abadi and the Iraqi nationalists have support from certain groups that the Iranian-backed forces do not: the Iraqi Sunni Arabs and the US. Even should the Kurds break away from Iraq, the Iraqi nationalists are likely to prevail over the Iranian proxies, because the Sunni Arabs provide the additional weight needed and Trump is eyeing Iraq as the front line in the US' war on Iran.
But over the next 12 months, Haider Al-Abadi will have to tread carefully. His reputation has been made through defeating ISIS - how he handles the Kurds or Iran will determine his prominence in Iraq's future.
Though ISIS has been driven out of its urban centres in Iraq, they still hold onto areas in Tel Afar, Hawija and western Anbar Province. Even should the Iraqi Army and affiliates crush ISIS from the region, there is every potential that ISIS may return. The trigger for an ISIS return is further conflict fueled by Iran and the Kurdish question.
September this year will see the Kurds vote for independence in a referendum. Iraqi Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi, though pro-American, is anti-referendum and as such Kurdish independence would weaken his hand considerably. This could lead to a civil war between the Iraqi Kurds and the rest of Iraq, putting America in a difficult position, as both Iraq and the Kurds are US allies.
Unlike in Syria, Iran is a destabilizing factor in Iraq. With the Iraqi provincial and federal elections to take place in 2018, a new divide is emerging: on one side of the divide is the likes of Nouri Al-Maliki and Iranian-backed political parties and militias. On the other is Muqtada As-Sadr, Iyad Allawi and Haider Al-Abadi, who espouse Iraqi Nationalism and are more critical of Iran's role in the region. Yet both sides of this divide are Shi'ite.
With the establishment of Hash'd Ash-Sha'abi, or the Popular Mobilization forces, an intra Shi'ite war in Iraq is all the more likely, as many of the groups are fierce rivals and differ in how loyal they are to Iran or the Iraqi government. To strengthen his own hand, Abadi might unleash the Iranian-backed elements of Hashd Ash-Sha'abi on the Kurds, so that if the Kurds were victorious, Iran could be blamed and Abadi would remain Prime Minister.
In any case, Abadi and the Iraqi nationalists have support from certain groups that the Iranian-backed forces do not: the Iraqi Sunni Arabs and the US. Even should the Kurds break away from Iraq, the Iraqi nationalists are likely to prevail over the Iranian proxies, because the Sunni Arabs provide the additional weight needed and Trump is eyeing Iraq as the front line in the US' war on Iran.
But over the next 12 months, Haider Al-Abadi will have to tread carefully. His reputation has been made through defeating ISIS - how he handles the Kurds or Iran will determine his prominence in Iraq's future.
US continues to ignore Russian success in Syria
https://interfaceinstitute.org/2017/07/19/us-continues-to-ignore-russian-success-in-syria/
The uncomfortable truth about the Syrian Civil War is that Russia is helping to end it.
When the Arab Spring first began in 2011 in Syria, protests were quickly absorbed into an armed conflict between Syrian Sunnis from the countryside, backed by Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, and the rest of Syria, backing Bashar Al-Assad. The reason why Bashar Al-Assad never fell in the 6 years of conflict is because he is too popular with Syrians.
Since 2011, Assad’s Syrian Arab Army have maintained a presence in all major cities in Syria except Raqqa in 2014 and Idlib in 2015. Even the inhabitants of Deir Ez-Zor city, populated by Syrian Bedouins, who are normally more receptive to ISIS, have remained allied to Bashar Al-Assad for the entirety of the war.
When rebels started making larger gains against the Syrian government in western Syria, Bashar Al-Assad called on Russia to assist his government in regaining control of Syria. Russia’s accomplishments in almost 2 years have been more profound than US gains in Afghanistan and Iraq over the last 15 years.
The Russians learned from the US’ mistake in Iraq: regime change leads to terrorism. The Russians, therefore, decided that the antidote to terrorism would be to do an “Iraq War in reverse”: strengthen an existing regime, rather than change it. And it has worked.
Since the Russians have entered the Syrian Civil War, the city of Aleppo has been stabilized. Many of the rebels previously holed up in other Syrian areas have been moved into the rebel-held province of Idlib. And, more recently, deconfliction zones were established to enable the Syrian Arab Army to focus more heavily on ISIS than the other rebels. This has resulted in the Syrian Government regaining vast swathes of countryside in Aleppo, Homs and Damascus provinces.
The US has been silent on this. The chemical attacks earlier this year – neither proven nor unproven to be initiated by the Syrian Government – led President Donald Trump to order an airstrike on a Syrian airbase – the first time the US intentionally launched a military attack on the Syrian Government in the war. And Rex Tillerson, who previously said the Syrians should decide who their President should be, began to call for the overthrow of Bashar Al-Assad.
Of course, the US is highly unlikely to engage militarily to remove the Assad regime in Syria. But it does show an attempt to undermine Russian efforts in Syria and focus the west’s attention on its own war on ISIS rather than on Russian success in Syria.
However, should the US not learn from Russian success in Syria, they would be unable to end either the Iraq or Afghan conflicts. And with 20 trillion dollars of debt, the US cannot sustain their current foreign policy.
Iran, Ikhwan and Salafi politics realigned
https://interfaceinstitute.org/2017/07/18/iran-ikhwan-and-salafi-politics-realigned/
In the modern Middle-East, the worldviews of Iran, the Ikhwan and the Salafis are the most prominent.
Iran’s influence on the Middle-East has manifested itself in a variety of different ways. Since the revolution of 1979, it has developed its reputation as a meddler in Arab affairs through creating Hezbollah in Lebanon in 1982 and backing Palestine against Israel. As a result of the Iran-Iraq war, Iran and Syria created an alliance, which has benefited both countries.
Because of the Iraq War (2003), Iranian and Shi’ite dominance in the Middle-East increased greatly. This has been further consolidated by Iranian support for Bashar Al-Assad in the Syrian civil war, and the Arab Spring even allowed Iran to extend its influence into Yemen (though Iran’s influence on the Houthis is mostly political, counter to the Media’s narrative.) In any case, Iran has benefit enormously from the affairs of Arabs.
The Ikhwani influence on the Middle-East was most prominent in Egypt, where President Mohammed Morsi rose to power in 2012. The Ikhwan, or the Muslim Brotherhood, have long dwelt in Egypt, but never held power before 2012. However, 2013 saw a great reversal in Ikhwan dominance, with Egyptians protesting Mohammed Morsi’s rule and forcing him out of office. The Egyptian protest of 2013 was the largest protest in history.
Under the Morsi government, ties between Iran and Egypt were strengthened after decades of hostility. This mirrors Iran’s strong ties to Qatar, Turkey and Hamas. In every country where the Ikhwan worldview dominates, a close yet complex relationship develops between said countries and Iran. Both the Iranian and Ikhwan worldview are more pro-Palestinian than their Salafi counterparts.
Understanding this, then, helps us glimpse into what is going on between Qatar and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia would like Qatar not to continue its support for the Ikhwan ideology and stop being as close to Iran. This is an affront not only against Iran, but also against Turkey and Hamas, who share Qatar’s ideology. UAE (Dubai) and Egypt have sided with Saudi Arabia because the Ikhwan threatens the Egyptian government, which the UAE supports.
Dangerously for Saudi Arabia, targeting Qatar for supporting the Ikhwan exposes Saudi Arabia’s own implicit alliance with Israel. The reason for this alliance is that Israel benefits from the instability created by Salafi ideology in Al-Qaeda and ISIS. Israel benefits from its enemies fighting each other, and Saudi Arabia provides the perfect ideology from which wars and instability are created.
However, the US is showing impatience at Saudi’s own meddling and churning of instability. The US has remained in Afghanistan for the past 16 years and has been in and out of Iraq, from 2003 – 2011 and then from 2014 until present, and the instability in both countries is set to continue. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, the US has continued fighting proxies of Saudi Arabia with no end in sight.
What we are currently witnessing is a realignment of political alliances as a result of impending peace in Syria. In Syria, the Salafis and the Ikhwan were allied against Iran and the Syrian Government. But Russia has forced Turkey – and with it, the Ikhwan support of the Syrian Opposition – into dialogue, and violence has correspondingly been greatly reduced in Syria.
However, with two of Iran’s allies decimated – Syria and Iraq – and with the Ikhwan suffering yet another terrible loss, both the Ikhwan and Iran are looking for a new target. Saudi Arabia is that target. This is signaled by Iranian and Turkish support for Qatar in the Gulf crisis.
It seems that, instead of the more recent Qatar-Turkey-Saudi axis against Syria, the Qatar-Turkey-Iran axis will be formed against Saudi Arabia. The deal between Iran and the Ikhwan is probably for the destruction of the Saudi state, replaced by a state run by the Muslim Brotherhood, to decimate Salafi doctrine and reward Turkey for its role in restoring peace to an Iran-backed Syria.
However, such a project would be dangerous at the least. ISIS is eyeing Saudi Arabia as its next target, so the Iran-Ikhwan plan may backfire, and badly.
Why ISIS is set to grow – not shrink – in the Middle-East
https://interfaceinstitute.org/2017/07/14/why-isis-is-set-to-grow-not-shrink-in-the-middle-east/
People who believe ISIS will be destroyed after the liberation of Syria and Iraq are not seeing the whole picture.
Many strategists of counter terrorism believe that, should ISIS be destroyed from Syria and Iraq, they won’t be able to come back, and that Al-Qaeda is making more inroads by playing the “long game”.
This ignores how much weaker Al-Qaeda has become since the death of Osama Bin Laden and the rise of ISIS. The only reasons why we’re still talking about Al-Qaeda is because they represent a serious threat to Yemen and Afghanistan. In Syria, Al-Qaeda would join ISIS if the Assad Government were removed. They are only separate today because it is more acceptable for countries to fund Al-Qaeda than ISIS.
As it is, should the Assad Government stay in Syria, it is near impossible for Al-Qaeda to remain in Syria at the conclusion of the civil war. They will be completely obliterated – Jabhat Feteh Ash-Sham will be but a memory of the Syrian Civil War.
But ISIS… ISIS’ origins are in Iraq, and as long as Iraq is as unstable as it has been since 2003, ISIS will also remain in Iraq. While Iraqi military gains have been impressive, ISIS has been gaining ground in suicide bombs and insurgent attacks, especially in Baghdad. While crushing terrorism in Syria is much easier – letting the dictator stay in power – this is unlikely to work as well in Iraq.
With Russia set to stabilize Syria and Libya, ISIS will be forced to dig deeper into the fabric of Iraq in order to survive. This represents one of the most serious challenges to the Trump Administration: how to stabilize Iraq and deprive ISIS of an underground safe haven.
Worryingly, while ISIS will be continuing to destabilize Iraq, their efforts will be turned towards Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. For further information on how ISIS threatens Saudi Arabia, read the following article by Alistair Crooke.
In fact, it is easy to see how this has been the aim of ISIS all along: declare a Caliphate across Syria and Iraq, force all enemies to utterly destroy the Caliphate, then to “rebirth” the Caliphate in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.
So far, no one in counter terrorism is addressing this. They are looking at the paper tiger of Al-Qaeda in Syria, when they should be looking at the threat ISIS is to the Arabian Gulf!
Not only is war and instability coming to Saudi Arabia, but also to most of the other Gulf states: Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and U.A.E (Dubai), which may lead to the fall of these smaller kingdoms to ISIS. Such instability will cause an oil shortage – greatly increasing oil prices and forcing the whole world to gaze in horror at Saudi Arabia as they have been in Syria.
Destroying ISIS from the Arabian Gulf will be a near impossible task. Once ISIS detonates there, it will be easier for America to stabilize Iraq than drive ISIS out of Saudi Arabia.
The divide across Europe
https://interfaceinstitute.org/2017/07/13/the-divide-across-europe/
There is a divide across Europe between Globalists and Nationalists, a divide which President Donald Trump is making more observable to the world.
Across the Scandinavian countries, Germany, Netherlands and France, there is a championing of the perspective of the EU, globalism and heightened immigration. In other central European countries, such as Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, there is a drive to preserve national identity, borders and stem Muslim immigration.
Enter President Trump. His decision to begin his second visit in Poland signals to Europe that the American priorities are changing. The US is stepping into a void – a central Europe alienated by the EU. This alienation was caused by economic sanctions on EU countries who resist legislation on immigration. Prior to President Trump, Russia was starting to fill the void in central Europe. Now, the US is signalling that it intends to fill that void.
We are witnessing a realignment of global politics. Poland is now a more significant player than before. The opinions of France and Germany matter less to the US than before. Three different superpower blocks are emerging: one, dominated by Russia and China, succeeding the previously socialist block; the second, with the US, India, Japan, South Korea and central Europe, in which capitalist nationalism is pertinent; the third, with the EU and Turkey leading the way in tense but reciprocal ways.
This rupture between EU and self-determining European countries – created by alienating EU policies – is welcome news by Russia and China. However, it presents a difficulty for Britain. While it has voted for Brexit, there is much damage that has been caused by previous immigration policies similar to those of the EU, and much pressure from the political left to implement a soft Brexit, which would keep Britain in the orbit of the EU. Britain is stuck between the two worldviews of the EU and self-determining nationalism of President Trump.
Western Europe, under the grossly ideological views of the EU, is set to collapse and perhaps even become a new area of dominance for the Islamic world. Time will tell how this will affect the western nationalist and Russian/Chinese blocks. Sadly, for Britain, such a collapse might lead to unrest and even civil war.
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