Monday, June 29, 2020
Compromising on Syria for vengeance: Erdogan's Grand Startegy
Since the attempted coup of July 2016, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan has been fixated on vengeance against the autocratic wing of the Middle-East.
Turkey has been growing weary of the United States and her allies since the beginning of the Arab Spring. From 2011, Turkey was shouldering most of the burden behind training and equipping the Free Syrian Army against the Syrian government, while the United States refused to act militarily. In 2013, a military coup changed Egypt from Turkish ally to nemesis and, in 2014, the United States decided to use the Kurds in their fight against ISIS in Syria.
But for President Erdogan, it was the parallels between Egypt in 2013 and Turkey in 2016 which were the most alarming. US ally the United Arab Emirates backed both the Egyptian military coup and the attempted military coup in Turkey, and Saudi Arabia strongly backed the UAE in these efforts. With signs that the autocratic wing of the Middle-East increasingly had the ear of the United States, it was President Erdogan's decision to compromise with Russia, instead of the US, to yield better results.
Turkish compromise with Russia benefited both parties enormously. Since the Russian-Turkish partnership began, ISIS has been dislodged from all of Syria; Syrian rebels have been moved from various enclaves into Idlib; the US' hold on the Syrian Kurds has been weakened substantially and, recently, the southern half of Idlib was taken back by the Syrian government.
But Russia achieved these only at a price palatable to Turkey. For example, until recently the southern half of Idlib, though devoid of rebels, still had Turkish observation posts throughout - until Turkey intervened in Libya. After Turkey propped up the Government of National Accord in western Libya, Turkey removed its observation posts and ceded control of southern Idlib to the Syrian government.
What seems to be happening is that Turkey is compliant with Russia in Syria only if it receives adequate compensation for doing so. This explains why there is Russian interference across the Middle-East: Russia is using its influence over other Middle-Eastern countries as leverage for Syria. Russian support for Haftar in Libya and the Houthis in Yemen, therefore, is conditional on support for Bashar Al-Assad by regional players.
Crucially, this means that Turkey is likely to, eventually, allow Bashar Al-Assad to regain control over all of Syria - but in return, Russia will likely have to cede to Turkey control of two other nations mired in conflict: Libya and Yemen. Since Russia, Iran and Syria are all under US sanctions and since the autocratic wing of the Middle-East is largely subservient to the United States, Turkey is the only other power that Russia can rely on to attain its vision for Syria.
The reason President Erdogan is eyeing both Libya and Yemen in exchange for Syria goes deeper than influence, though: both Libya and Yemen have a UAE-backed autocratic force vying for control of the country. For Turkey, military intervention in both Libya and Yemen is personal. It is intervention against proxies of the UAE and Saudi Arabia, nations that supported the attempted military coup of July 2016.
Should Turkey succeed in exchanging all of Syria for political control of Libya and Yemen, the autocratic wing of the Middle-East would feel the very pressure that they had once applied to Turkey upon their own heads. After Libya and Yemen, Turkey would do all it could to erode autocratic influence elsewhere - and Saudi Arabia and the UAE in particular would have much to fear from a vengeful Tayyip Erdogan.
Compromising on Libya for Idlib: Putin's grand strategy
Recently, Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan sent arms, Syrian militias and his military in support of Libya's Government of National Accord. By doing so, President Erdogan saved the Libyan government from General Haftar's forces, which were marching on the capital Tripoli. Such a move was long ago predicted in our Forgotten Middle-East blog.
By contrast, in February this year Russian, Syrian and Iranian forces clashed with those in Syria's Idlib. Dozens of Turkish soldiers were killed. In retaliation, Turkey unleashed a barrage on approaching Iranian and Syrian targets, only to be stopped by a cease-fire deal reached between President Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin.
The Russian strategy has always been to get Turkey on side in Syria. That Turkey still refuses to compromise suggests that President Putin has not yet offered sufficient compensation to justify Turkish loss of Idlib. To accomplish this, Russia is likely to compromise on Libya.
Turkey is trying to gain drilling rights for gas reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean. If the presence of the Government of National Accord is consolidated over all of Libya, Turkey would no longer be isolated diplomatically in their dispute. Egypt, Israel, Cyprus and Greece all oppose Turkey sharing in the gas reserves of the Mediterranean, and all support Haftar Al-Khalifa in Libya's east.
Russia, meanwhile, has largely supported Haftar Al-Khalifa in concordance with Egypt. But Russia has also encouraged dialogue between Haftar and the Government of National Accord, and its priority remains fixed on Syria. President Putin would not hesitate to seal the fate of Haftar Al-Khalifa if the result was a net gain for Syria.
The Government of National Accord consolidating all of Libya would pose a serious threat to Egyptian President Abdul Feteh As-Sisi. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood would be revived and supported from Libya which, in turn, would force President Sisi to turn to Russia for help. This provides President Putin with his perfect opportunity.
The only place where Egypt could strike back at Turkey successfully would be in Syria, where the war is nearing its end. Although overt military support is unlikely, diplomatic pressure from Egypt on regional players like Saudi Arabia, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and the US could see support for Idlib dropped in favour of a settlement with Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad.
For the autocratic wing of the Sunni Middle-East - Egypt, the UAE and Saudi Arabia in particular - losing Haftar in Libya would force a strategic rethink. With Iran under sanctions and Iraq in anti-Iran protests, the autocrats would be perceive Turkey as the greater threat to regional stability. This, in turn, only increases the likelihood of a settlement in Syria in favour of Bashar Al-Assad - himself an autocrat - and would once again demonstrate the genius of Russian President Vladimir Putin in his approach to foreign policy.
How the United States could have won the war on terror in 2003
While invading Iraq in 2003 greatly increased the threat of terrorism in the region, the only feasible option for decreasing terrorism in the region in the long-term was to weaken Iran.
While it is an exaggeration to say that Iran is the world’s number 1 sponsor of terrorism, it can certainly be said that Iran is the number 1 galvanizer of terrorism.
Without the Islamic Republic of Iran, 9-11 would have never happened. The Iranian revolution finished in February 1979 and threatened to spread the revolution elsewhere. The the first culprit of the Islamic revolution was Saudi Arabia.
9 months after the Iranian Revolution, in November 1979, extremists from within the kingdom seized the Grand Holy Mosque of Mecca and threatened to destroy it if their demands for a more Islamic country were not met. Though the extremists were executed, afterwards the kingdom underwent a conservative counterrevolution, which enabled the funding of Islamic jihad in the 1980’s and sowed the seeds for Bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda.
Though the extremists in Saudi Arabia were not politically affiliated with Iran, undoubtedly they were inspired by the Islamic revolution of Iran: either through admiration of Islamists taking control of Iran, or terrified of Iran’s Shi’a extremism and wanting a Sunni response provoked from within their own country.
What President Bush did in 2003, however, exacerbated and accelerated the increase of terrorism in the Middle-East. Instead of curbing Islamic extremism, the Iraq War empowered terrorism on both sides of the Sunni-Shi’ite spectrum, giving Iraq both Shi’a extremists and ISIS. If George Bush promised to go after terrorism, his actions in 2003 profoundly enhanced terrorism’s appeal across the Islamic world for both the Sunnis and Shi’ites.
Though going after Iraq was the worst of many bad options, going after US allies who have ties to Al-Qaeda funding would have not been much better. A conflict in the Arabian Gulf would have seriously risked instability in an area where the majority of the world’s oil comes from. For those who believe the west needs to get off oil, such an intervention might be considered necessary, but pragmatically it would have left the global economy far more vulnerable during the Great Financial Crisis than it was.
Weakening Iran in 2003, therefore, would have been the better option for ending radical Islamic terrorism’s appeal in the Middle-East. Iran has been the provocateur of extremism in US allies; it funds extremism itself and it is seeking nuclear weapons with the capacity to destroy Israel and the United States. It should not be forgotten that the national anthem of Iran is “death to America, death to Israel.” This is not hyperbole. This is the anthem of who is in charge of the most powerful country in the Middle-East.
However, weakening Iran would not mean regime change. Changing the regime in Iraq empowered extremists on both sides, and a regime change in Iran would have had a similar effect. Not only so: a US occupation of Iran’s population centres would have led to enormous amount of casualties for the US, as Iran is more politically unified than Iraq.
Instead of taking control of all of Iran, it would have been more feasible for the US to annex four provinces in Iran’s southeast, taking from Iran the Strait of Hormuz and all land crossings into Afghanistan and Pakistan. These areas are sparsely populated, which would have meant that, after a conventional war, occupation of them would have been easier even than occupying Iraq.
Better still: these provinces could be annexed from Iran and given to Afghanistan, which would mean Afghanistan would have a secure sea route that is not dominated by Russia, China or Pakistan. Such an option would have enabled Afghanistan to exploit its enormous mineral reserves much more quickly and would have connected Afghanistan to US allies in the Middle-East. This, in turn, would have allowed the Afghan war to end in a shorter amount of time.
Seeing a weaker Iran, US allies who previously funded Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan would have incentive to rebuild Afghanistan as a bulwark against Iran. A weaker Iran would have given US allies less reason to fund extremism and more assurance that their security would be looked after.
Saturday, October 13, 2018
Turkish Invasion into Afrin just the beginning
Edited version of original here:
http://jwaversyria.blogspot.com/2018/01/turkish-invasion-into-kurdish-afrin.html
On the 21st of January this year, Turkey launched the long-anticipated operation into the northwestern Syrian province of Afrin, a small part of the large territory held by the Syrian Kurds. But this operation is just the beginning of larger scaled operations in northern Syria by the Turkish military.
The Syrian Kurds greatly threaten President Erdogan's hold over Turkey to such an extent that, with the entry of Russia into the Syrian war, President Erdogan has been forced into recalculating his regional policy. Though publicly denouncing Bashar Al-Assad and demanding his removal from office, privately, Turkish opposition to Assad has softened considerably.
https://sputniknews.com/politics/201701281050105764-turkey-syria-russia-iran/
It is US policy, not Russian policy, that threatens Turkish interest in the region, and that because the US is funding the Syrian Kurds after the destruction of ISIS in Syria. Though Bashar Al-Assad is secular and not Islamist, he leads the Syrian Arab Republic, which favours the Arabs over the Kurds. But the US-supported Syrian Democratic Forces are largely Kurdish, and many of these fighters are allied to the YPG, which has been waging war against the Turkish government for decades.
Sentiment in Turkey is perhaps best expressed by MP Metin Kulunk: "Syria will become a second Vietnam for the US." This sentiment will likely embolden President Erdogan into not stopping the Turkish invasion into Afrin, but additionally fighting for control of Manbij to force the Kurds to the eastern side of the Euphrates River.
https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/201711161059157430-syria-second-vietnam-for-us/
Turkish ambition may not be limited to west of the Euphrates, either. Russia, Syria and Iran are not interested in seeing a long-term US presence in northeastern Syria. They see that this undermines the territorial sovereignty of Syria, but any attacks on the northeastern enclave by Russia, Syria or Iran would ignite serious hostility from the US.
Turkey, on the other hand, is a NATO ally. Turkish war on the US-backed Kurds in Syria would have more serious consequences for the US than anyone else. In such a scenario, the US would be forced to use Iraq for transit or withdraw entirely from Syria. Turkey would become a more permanent member of the Russian axis in the Middle-East, would purchase the Russia-designed S-300 missile defense system and result in Turkey's expulsion from the NATO alliance.
Either the US would abandon the Syrian Kurds and make an exit strategy from Syria, which is a shared goal of Russia, Syria, Iran and Turkey - or the United States would be forced into a conflict deeply unpopular at home.
As the Turks seek to remove the US-Kurdish presence from Syria, this might give Russia, Syria and Iran the green light they need from Turkey to cede the rebel-held province of Idlib to the Syrian government. Idlib is largely under the control of Al-Qaeda, but has also served as a dumping ground for rebels from other regions in Syria.
War between Turkey and the United States for northern Syria would humiliate the US and cede the region to Turkish influence - in exchange, Bashar Al-Assad would regain control of Idlib province. Such an arrangement would mean no further roadblocks would exist for Turkey, Russia, Syria and Iran to seriously negotiate a political settlement for ending the Syrian civil war.
http://jwaversyria.blogspot.com/2018/01/turkish-invasion-into-kurdish-afrin.html
On the 21st of January this year, Turkey launched the long-anticipated operation into the northwestern Syrian province of Afrin, a small part of the large territory held by the Syrian Kurds. But this operation is just the beginning of larger scaled operations in northern Syria by the Turkish military.
The Syrian Kurds greatly threaten President Erdogan's hold over Turkey to such an extent that, with the entry of Russia into the Syrian war, President Erdogan has been forced into recalculating his regional policy. Though publicly denouncing Bashar Al-Assad and demanding his removal from office, privately, Turkish opposition to Assad has softened considerably.
https://sputniknews.com/politics/201701281050105764-turkey-syria-russia-iran/
It is US policy, not Russian policy, that threatens Turkish interest in the region, and that because the US is funding the Syrian Kurds after the destruction of ISIS in Syria. Though Bashar Al-Assad is secular and not Islamist, he leads the Syrian Arab Republic, which favours the Arabs over the Kurds. But the US-supported Syrian Democratic Forces are largely Kurdish, and many of these fighters are allied to the YPG, which has been waging war against the Turkish government for decades.
Sentiment in Turkey is perhaps best expressed by MP Metin Kulunk: "Syria will become a second Vietnam for the US." This sentiment will likely embolden President Erdogan into not stopping the Turkish invasion into Afrin, but additionally fighting for control of Manbij to force the Kurds to the eastern side of the Euphrates River.
https://sputniknews.com/middleeast/201711161059157430-syria-second-vietnam-for-us/
Turkish ambition may not be limited to west of the Euphrates, either. Russia, Syria and Iran are not interested in seeing a long-term US presence in northeastern Syria. They see that this undermines the territorial sovereignty of Syria, but any attacks on the northeastern enclave by Russia, Syria or Iran would ignite serious hostility from the US.
Turkey, on the other hand, is a NATO ally. Turkish war on the US-backed Kurds in Syria would have more serious consequences for the US than anyone else. In such a scenario, the US would be forced to use Iraq for transit or withdraw entirely from Syria. Turkey would become a more permanent member of the Russian axis in the Middle-East, would purchase the Russia-designed S-300 missile defense system and result in Turkey's expulsion from the NATO alliance.
Either the US would abandon the Syrian Kurds and make an exit strategy from Syria, which is a shared goal of Russia, Syria, Iran and Turkey - or the United States would be forced into a conflict deeply unpopular at home.
As the Turks seek to remove the US-Kurdish presence from Syria, this might give Russia, Syria and Iran the green light they need from Turkey to cede the rebel-held province of Idlib to the Syrian government. Idlib is largely under the control of Al-Qaeda, but has also served as a dumping ground for rebels from other regions in Syria.
War between Turkey and the United States for northern Syria would humiliate the US and cede the region to Turkish influence - in exchange, Bashar Al-Assad would regain control of Idlib province. Such an arrangement would mean no further roadblocks would exist for Turkey, Russia, Syria and Iran to seriously negotiate a political settlement for ending the Syrian civil war.
Wednesday, September 12, 2018
Iran: Israel's 'Baptism of Fire'
First published 20/5/18:
http://jwaverfpolicy.blogspot.com/2018/05/iran-israels-baptism-of-fire-into-full.html
Pundits often said that the options with Iran were a nuclear deal or war. They may be right - but if so, it is unlikely to be US troops on the ground fighting it.
The American public are exhausted of war. President Donald Trump won his historic presidential campaign on an anti-war platform, including lambasting the "big, fat mistake" of the Iraq War. If the Iraq War was a big fat mistake for the US, an Iran war would be one of the biggest, fattest US conflicts since the Second World War.
In 2013, when Congress voted whether or not to strike the Syrian government, the American public were overwhelmingly against it. Since then, anti-war sentiment in the United States has not grown weaker but stronger.
So with a war-weary America, why has President Trump pulled out of the Iran Deal and made war with Iran more likely? Because though he cannot fight this war with current public support, he also knows he is not expected to by his closest ally Israel - except as a last resort.
Israel, on the other hand, is ready for war. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been granted overwhelming war powers, giving him the ability to wage war without a cabinet vote. Israel is also being welcomed into the Arab fold by countries Saudi Arabia, Egypt and UAE in particular, with an Israeli-Palestinian deal pending before full relations begin.
Prime Minister Netanyahu's rhetoric against Iran and its nuclear deal has culminated in Israel and Iran engaging in a series of military strikes in Syria. Yet with the risk of nuclear proliferation from Iran looming, Premier Netanyahu is unlikely to focus Israel's efforts on striking Iran's proxies. The Prime Minister has been known for having a "go at it alone" approach in Middle-East affairs, such as when he went to the House of Representatives in Washington to condemn the Iran nuclear deal in 2015, against President Obama's wishes.
In a conflict with Iran, Israel would not only have the political support of the United States (which Israel did not have under President Obama) but Israel would also be supported by many of its Arab neighbours. In fact, an Israeli war with Iran may just be the "baptism of fire" required by the Arab states to prove that Israel can vouch for their security. With the rise of Turkey as another adversary to Arab determinism in the Middle-East and beyond, Israel is more likely to garner Arab support should it prove itself by militarily intervening against the enemies of the Arabs, such as Iran.
In such a context, perhaps it is understood by both President Trump and Premier Netanyahu that, in the advent of an Iran War, an Iran-Israeli conflict is the best case scenario for the US, Israel and the wider Middle-East: President Trump would not embroil the US in another costly Middle-East conflict, Israel would prove itself capable of protecting its Arab neighbours, and Israeli-Arab relations would soar.
Since its initial fight for survival, the nation of Israel has come a long way with its Arab neighbours. Because of this, the fury of the Israeli military may soon, with Arab support, be directed against Iran, a stark and historic contrast to previous conflicts.
http://jwaverfpolicy.blogspot.com/2018/05/iran-israels-baptism-of-fire-into-full.html
Pundits often said that the options with Iran were a nuclear deal or war. They may be right - but if so, it is unlikely to be US troops on the ground fighting it.
The American public are exhausted of war. President Donald Trump won his historic presidential campaign on an anti-war platform, including lambasting the "big, fat mistake" of the Iraq War. If the Iraq War was a big fat mistake for the US, an Iran war would be one of the biggest, fattest US conflicts since the Second World War.
In 2013, when Congress voted whether or not to strike the Syrian government, the American public were overwhelmingly against it. Since then, anti-war sentiment in the United States has not grown weaker but stronger.
So with a war-weary America, why has President Trump pulled out of the Iran Deal and made war with Iran more likely? Because though he cannot fight this war with current public support, he also knows he is not expected to by his closest ally Israel - except as a last resort.
Israel, on the other hand, is ready for war. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been granted overwhelming war powers, giving him the ability to wage war without a cabinet vote. Israel is also being welcomed into the Arab fold by countries Saudi Arabia, Egypt and UAE in particular, with an Israeli-Palestinian deal pending before full relations begin.
Prime Minister Netanyahu's rhetoric against Iran and its nuclear deal has culminated in Israel and Iran engaging in a series of military strikes in Syria. Yet with the risk of nuclear proliferation from Iran looming, Premier Netanyahu is unlikely to focus Israel's efforts on striking Iran's proxies. The Prime Minister has been known for having a "go at it alone" approach in Middle-East affairs, such as when he went to the House of Representatives in Washington to condemn the Iran nuclear deal in 2015, against President Obama's wishes.
In a conflict with Iran, Israel would not only have the political support of the United States (which Israel did not have under President Obama) but Israel would also be supported by many of its Arab neighbours. In fact, an Israeli war with Iran may just be the "baptism of fire" required by the Arab states to prove that Israel can vouch for their security. With the rise of Turkey as another adversary to Arab determinism in the Middle-East and beyond, Israel is more likely to garner Arab support should it prove itself by militarily intervening against the enemies of the Arabs, such as Iran.
In such a context, perhaps it is understood by both President Trump and Premier Netanyahu that, in the advent of an Iran War, an Iran-Israeli conflict is the best case scenario for the US, Israel and the wider Middle-East: President Trump would not embroil the US in another costly Middle-East conflict, Israel would prove itself capable of protecting its Arab neighbours, and Israeli-Arab relations would soar.
Since its initial fight for survival, the nation of Israel has come a long way with its Arab neighbours. Because of this, the fury of the Israeli military may soon, with Arab support, be directed against Iran, a stark and historic contrast to previous conflicts.
Monday, September 10, 2018
The impending Russia-US deal on Afghanistan
First published 24/8/18:
http://jwaverterror.blogspot.com/2018/08/why-us-must-withdraw-from-pakistan-to.html
To win more speedily in Afghanistan, the United States must repair relations with Russia, withdraw from Pakistan and take the northern route into the country.
If there was ever a chance for President Trump to restore relations with Russia, weaken China and defeat radical Islamism, Afghanistan is that opportunity.
It has been a year since the Trump Administration unveiled its South Asia strategy, which was aimed at ending the Afghan war by having a conditions-based approach rather than a time-based approach, applying more international pressure on Pakistan, increasing trilateral ties between the US, India and Afghanistan and, most importantly for the US, achieving an outcome worthy of the sacrifices of the US military in South and Central Asia.
Unlike Iraq, Syria or Libya, the involvement of the United States in Afghanistan has been with support from the majority of the Afghan people and has been against a regime linked to the terrorists who perpetrated 9-11 - the Taliban. As former President Obama rightly said, if the Iraq war was the "bad war," Afghanistan was the "good war."
For the Trump Administration to pull out of Afghanistan at this critical moment would send a message to America's adversities that it has no interest in prolonged and expensive conflicts, leading America's adversities to make calculated risks against it, like the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. In short, US withdrawal from Afghanistan would make war with Iran or North Korea more likely rather than less likely.
The current South Asia strategy has shown positive results in 12 months. For the first time since 2001, two cease-fires were announced during Eid Al-Fitr between the Taliban and the Ghani government, an unprecedented moment in the last 40 years of conflict. This can be directly related to US pressure on Pakistan and increased ties with India, perhaps the most successful changes in the US' strategy.
While maintaining pressure on Paksitan is achieving positive results in the short-term, in the long-term Pakistan is not a strategic partner that shares the same interests as those of the United States. Pakistan has no geopolitical interest in seeing a pro-US democracy in Afghanistan, nor in dismantling the Haqqani network or the Taliban.
Pakistan also has covert support from China in continuing its destabilizing policy. This is particularly relevant as Pakistan funds terrorism in India-related spheres of influence, which includes Afghanistan. With the US increasingly looking to China as their greatest adversity, Pakistan should be seen as an Islamist-Chinese vessel that shares little strategic interest with the United States - and that in spite of the election of new Prime Minister Imran Khan.
Conversely, Russia has a geo-strategic interest in Afghanistan as paramount to that of the United States. Unlike China, Russia sees Afghanistan as a springboard from which terrorism could reach its southern border. For this reason the Kremlin is deepening relations with Pakistan and the Taliban, not out of interest but out of necessity, as few in Russia really believe the United States will remain in Afghanistan much longer.
Yet for all the Media talk of withdrawal, under President Trump the United States is more invested in Afghanistan than ever. Just recently in a Military Times article titled "US rejects invitation to join Russia talks on Afghanistan," the journalist notes that Afghanistan will be integrated by the US into its Indo-Pacific strategy. This can only mean one thing: further deterioration of relations between Pakistan and the United States in exchange for closer cooperation with India in Afghanistan and the wider region.
However, should relations deteriorate further, the Pakistanis will block the US from entering Afghanistan via their sea-land routes, as Afghanistan remains land-locked. This will put the Trump Administration in a very difficult position: to withdraw from Afghanistan would cede the region to China; to wage war with Pakistan or Iran for a land route would be deeply unpopular with the American public.
But a deal with Russia could provide the solution to this conundrum.
Many of President Trump's supporters see that a deal with Russia is not only preferable but essential for curbing Chinese influence worldwide. Right now Russian-Chinese ties are exceptionally strong, comparable to ties between the United States and Britain at the conclusion of the Second World War. To make inroads on this tight alliance must begin with converging interests.
This has played out to a certain extent in Syria, but the US' unwillingness to engage in any peace process except Geneva has had a counter-productive impact on US-Russian relations. But shared goals of eliminating terrorism, restoring stability to Syria and securing Israel's interests are proof that, indeed, Russia and the United States agree on enough that a future deal regarding Afghanistan is possible.
Components of such a deal would likely include ceding Pakistan to Russia, the relaxing of certain US sanctions and promising Russia and the nations on Afghanistan's northern border a more significant portion of Afghan economic projects - and that over Pakistan, China and Iran. In exchange, Russia would provide the US a land route into Afghanistan, more support for the Afghan government and more assistance in America's counter-terrorism strategy.
Such a deal may even be in the works right now, but through India rather than direct contacts. India has strong ties to both Russia and the United States and has a vested interest in weaning the US off Pakistan in exchange for more friendly ties with the Kremlin.
For Afghanistan's sake, a US-Russian-Indian deal is best case scenario. Worst case scenario is a repeat of the debacle of the 1980's, with another superpower defeated by Pakistan and terrorism ready to strike the world again.
http://jwaverterror.blogspot.com/2018/08/why-us-must-withdraw-from-pakistan-to.html
To win more speedily in Afghanistan, the United States must repair relations with Russia, withdraw from Pakistan and take the northern route into the country.
If there was ever a chance for President Trump to restore relations with Russia, weaken China and defeat radical Islamism, Afghanistan is that opportunity.
It has been a year since the Trump Administration unveiled its South Asia strategy, which was aimed at ending the Afghan war by having a conditions-based approach rather than a time-based approach, applying more international pressure on Pakistan, increasing trilateral ties between the US, India and Afghanistan and, most importantly for the US, achieving an outcome worthy of the sacrifices of the US military in South and Central Asia.
Unlike Iraq, Syria or Libya, the involvement of the United States in Afghanistan has been with support from the majority of the Afghan people and has been against a regime linked to the terrorists who perpetrated 9-11 - the Taliban. As former President Obama rightly said, if the Iraq war was the "bad war," Afghanistan was the "good war."
For the Trump Administration to pull out of Afghanistan at this critical moment would send a message to America's adversities that it has no interest in prolonged and expensive conflicts, leading America's adversities to make calculated risks against it, like the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. In short, US withdrawal from Afghanistan would make war with Iran or North Korea more likely rather than less likely.
The current South Asia strategy has shown positive results in 12 months. For the first time since 2001, two cease-fires were announced during Eid Al-Fitr between the Taliban and the Ghani government, an unprecedented moment in the last 40 years of conflict. This can be directly related to US pressure on Pakistan and increased ties with India, perhaps the most successful changes in the US' strategy.
While maintaining pressure on Paksitan is achieving positive results in the short-term, in the long-term Pakistan is not a strategic partner that shares the same interests as those of the United States. Pakistan has no geopolitical interest in seeing a pro-US democracy in Afghanistan, nor in dismantling the Haqqani network or the Taliban.
Pakistan also has covert support from China in continuing its destabilizing policy. This is particularly relevant as Pakistan funds terrorism in India-related spheres of influence, which includes Afghanistan. With the US increasingly looking to China as their greatest adversity, Pakistan should be seen as an Islamist-Chinese vessel that shares little strategic interest with the United States - and that in spite of the election of new Prime Minister Imran Khan.
Conversely, Russia has a geo-strategic interest in Afghanistan as paramount to that of the United States. Unlike China, Russia sees Afghanistan as a springboard from which terrorism could reach its southern border. For this reason the Kremlin is deepening relations with Pakistan and the Taliban, not out of interest but out of necessity, as few in Russia really believe the United States will remain in Afghanistan much longer.
Yet for all the Media talk of withdrawal, under President Trump the United States is more invested in Afghanistan than ever. Just recently in a Military Times article titled "US rejects invitation to join Russia talks on Afghanistan," the journalist notes that Afghanistan will be integrated by the US into its Indo-Pacific strategy. This can only mean one thing: further deterioration of relations between Pakistan and the United States in exchange for closer cooperation with India in Afghanistan and the wider region.
However, should relations deteriorate further, the Pakistanis will block the US from entering Afghanistan via their sea-land routes, as Afghanistan remains land-locked. This will put the Trump Administration in a very difficult position: to withdraw from Afghanistan would cede the region to China; to wage war with Pakistan or Iran for a land route would be deeply unpopular with the American public.
But a deal with Russia could provide the solution to this conundrum.
Many of President Trump's supporters see that a deal with Russia is not only preferable but essential for curbing Chinese influence worldwide. Right now Russian-Chinese ties are exceptionally strong, comparable to ties between the United States and Britain at the conclusion of the Second World War. To make inroads on this tight alliance must begin with converging interests.
This has played out to a certain extent in Syria, but the US' unwillingness to engage in any peace process except Geneva has had a counter-productive impact on US-Russian relations. But shared goals of eliminating terrorism, restoring stability to Syria and securing Israel's interests are proof that, indeed, Russia and the United States agree on enough that a future deal regarding Afghanistan is possible.
Components of such a deal would likely include ceding Pakistan to Russia, the relaxing of certain US sanctions and promising Russia and the nations on Afghanistan's northern border a more significant portion of Afghan economic projects - and that over Pakistan, China and Iran. In exchange, Russia would provide the US a land route into Afghanistan, more support for the Afghan government and more assistance in America's counter-terrorism strategy.
Such a deal may even be in the works right now, but through India rather than direct contacts. India has strong ties to both Russia and the United States and has a vested interest in weaning the US off Pakistan in exchange for more friendly ties with the Kremlin.
For Afghanistan's sake, a US-Russian-Indian deal is best case scenario. Worst case scenario is a repeat of the debacle of the 1980's, with another superpower defeated by Pakistan and terrorism ready to strike the world again.
Yemen: the next Islamic State
Published previously on 23/12/17:
http://jwaverforgotten.blogspot.com/2017/12/yemen-next-islamic-state-update-2018.html
Since the 21st of April 2015, Saudi Arabia has been leading a coalition against Zaidi rebels in Yemen, the Houthis, in an attempt to restore the recognized President of Yemen, Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, to power. In the subsequent chaos of the Yemen war, there has been one group gaining momentum at the expense of both President Hadi and the Zaidi Houthi rebels.
And it is not ISIS.
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is gaining the most out of the chaos of Saudi Arabia's Yemen war. Like ISIS, which was born out of the Iraq War and built up during the Syrian civil war, AQAP is building up its momentum as a direct result of foreign intervention. And like ISIS, AQAP is underestimated by the group utilizing them.
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, though dangerous, is perceived by Saudi Arabia as the 'lesser of two evils' against the Houthis and thus receives aid to fight the Zaidi rebels. AQAP has since emerged as a legitimate player for control of Yemen.
It is unlikely that AQAP would attempt to establish a Caliphate as ISIS has done. The reason for this is that the tribes working with AQAP have a different political agenda. ISIS was born out of an alliance with Iraqi Ba'ath Party militants disenfranchised with America's vision for a democratic Iraq. The Iraqi Ba'ath Party has sought to create unity across different countries, which coincides with ISIS' aim in establishing a caliphate.
The tribes which back AQAP are largely tribes from Southern Yemen, a previously independent state known as the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. These tribes seek independence from (and the crippling of) the government based in Sana'a in the north.
The UAE is already anticipating that such independence will be achieved. With Yemen President Hadi showing few signs of popularity on the ground, UAE is shifting its support to Aidarous Az-Zubaidi, a figurehead of the Southern Movement, drawing harsh criticisms from the Hadi government.
As with Sisi in Egypt and Haftar Al-Khalifa in Libya, strengthening the Southern Movement in Yemen would mean that the tribes in the south would become anti-Islamist, autocratic, and would force AQAP into the north exclusively.
In Northern Yemen, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has been the most effective fighting force against the Houthis. No matter who controls Southern Yemen, AQAP will continue gaining strongholds in Northern Yemen at the expense of the Houthis. This would likely weaken Northern Yemen sufficiently enough for the south to achieve autonomy.
However, the threat posed by an AQAP-dominated Northern Yemen is not to be underestimated. It threatens not only Southern Yemen and Saudi Arabia, but the United States as well.
Unfortunately for Yemen, the options are few. There are few forces in the region capable of defeating the Houthis. Like in Iraq and Syria, moderate forces are highly unlikely to win this war: Al-Qaeda and the Houthis are far stronger contenders.
http://jwaverforgotten.blogspot.com/2017/12/yemen-next-islamic-state-update-2018.html
Since the 21st of April 2015, Saudi Arabia has been leading a coalition against Zaidi rebels in Yemen, the Houthis, in an attempt to restore the recognized President of Yemen, Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, to power. In the subsequent chaos of the Yemen war, there has been one group gaining momentum at the expense of both President Hadi and the Zaidi Houthi rebels.
And it is not ISIS.
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is gaining the most out of the chaos of Saudi Arabia's Yemen war. Like ISIS, which was born out of the Iraq War and built up during the Syrian civil war, AQAP is building up its momentum as a direct result of foreign intervention. And like ISIS, AQAP is underestimated by the group utilizing them.
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, though dangerous, is perceived by Saudi Arabia as the 'lesser of two evils' against the Houthis and thus receives aid to fight the Zaidi rebels. AQAP has since emerged as a legitimate player for control of Yemen.
It is unlikely that AQAP would attempt to establish a Caliphate as ISIS has done. The reason for this is that the tribes working with AQAP have a different political agenda. ISIS was born out of an alliance with Iraqi Ba'ath Party militants disenfranchised with America's vision for a democratic Iraq. The Iraqi Ba'ath Party has sought to create unity across different countries, which coincides with ISIS' aim in establishing a caliphate.
The tribes which back AQAP are largely tribes from Southern Yemen, a previously independent state known as the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. These tribes seek independence from (and the crippling of) the government based in Sana'a in the north.
The UAE is already anticipating that such independence will be achieved. With Yemen President Hadi showing few signs of popularity on the ground, UAE is shifting its support to Aidarous Az-Zubaidi, a figurehead of the Southern Movement, drawing harsh criticisms from the Hadi government.
As with Sisi in Egypt and Haftar Al-Khalifa in Libya, strengthening the Southern Movement in Yemen would mean that the tribes in the south would become anti-Islamist, autocratic, and would force AQAP into the north exclusively.
In Northern Yemen, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has been the most effective fighting force against the Houthis. No matter who controls Southern Yemen, AQAP will continue gaining strongholds in Northern Yemen at the expense of the Houthis. This would likely weaken Northern Yemen sufficiently enough for the south to achieve autonomy.
However, the threat posed by an AQAP-dominated Northern Yemen is not to be underestimated. It threatens not only Southern Yemen and Saudi Arabia, but the United States as well.
Unfortunately for Yemen, the options are few. There are few forces in the region capable of defeating the Houthis. Like in Iraq and Syria, moderate forces are highly unlikely to win this war: Al-Qaeda and the Houthis are far stronger contenders.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)